revision of the federal laws controlling the financing of campaigns for federal office since the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"). 4 Title I of BCRA banned national parties and officeholders from raising and spending "soft money."
5 Soft money can be defined simply as contributions that are not subject to FECA's contribution regulations while "hard money" refers to contributions that do fall under FECA's domain. 6 FECA established a series of mandatory limits on contributions to candidates and mandatory ceilings on expenditures.
7 Senator John McCain (R-AZ), one of the bill's co-sponsors who has fought for significant campaign finance reform for more than half a decade, hoped the law would "restore the public's faith in government." 8 President Bush hailed BCRA by stating that " [a] ll of the American electorate will benefit from these measures to strengthen our democracy." 9 However, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) spearheaded a First Amendment challenge to BCRA on the basis that the statute unconstitutionally restricted freedom of speech by regulating soft money political donations and advertising for federal elections. 10 regulation of electioneering communications and Congress's effort to plug soft money loopholes, did not violate the First Amendment and must be upheld. 12 As a result of BCRA and the McConnell decision, the tremendous amount of soft money previously raised and spent by the national parties and federal officeholders was eliminated from the campaign finance arena. 13 Despite the significant campaign finance reforms effected by BCRA, soft money still played a significant role in the 2004 federal elections.
14 Because BCRA banned national parties and officeholders from raising and spending soft money, more unregulated money flowed into and was spent by "527" nonprofit organizations than in any previous federal election cycle. 15 These organizations, nicknamed after § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C."), became a prime alternative for unions, interest groups, and wealthy individuals who in previous elections donated unlimited amounts of cash directly to the Republican and Democratic parties. 16 Groups organized under § 527 alone spent over $339 million between July and November 2004 before the presidential election and a total of $550 million during the entire 2004 election cycle. 17 The pro-GOP "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth" and the antiBush "Media Fund" were perhaps the most recognizable of these groups because each aired a series of controversial ads during the presidential campaign. 19 The proposed 527 Reform Act would require § 527 groups to register as political action committees ("PACs") with the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") and would subject them to federal campaign laws under 93, 124 (2003) . For example, in 1996 the top five corporate soft-money donors gave more than $9 million in soft money to the two national parties. Id. In 2000, the national parties raised almost $300 million (over 60% of their total soft-money fundraising) from just 800 donors. Id. In the 2000 election cycle, thirty-five of the fifty largest soft-money donors gave more than $100,000 to both parties. Id. at 125 n.12. These practices indicate that many corporate contributions were motivated by a desire for access to candidates. Id. at 124.
25. 540 U.S. at 137.
which they could only use federal hard money contributions to finance ads that promote or attack federal candidates, regardless of whether the ads expressly advocate the election or defeat of the candidate.
20
If the bipartisan legislation becomes law, the 527 Reform Act's effort to regulate § 527 groups the same way BCRA regulates national parties and officeholders must overcome the same constitutional hurdles as BCRA did in McConnell.
21
The 527 Reform Act will most likely be challenged as a violation of the First Amendment rights of these organizations, and campaign finance experts believe this issue would be taken by the Supreme Court. 22 In fact, McCain's version of the 527 Reform Act introduced in the Senate on February 2, 2005 provides for a special review process for any constitutional challenge to the statute. 23 Furthermore, if the expenditures of § 527 groups are regulated similarly to the expenditures of national parties, then groups organized under § 501 of the I.R.C. might become the next location for the enormous amount of soft money raised and spent for federal elections.
24 This note will argue that the 527 Reform Act most likely will be upheld by the Supreme Court under the deferential First Amendment standard set forth in
McConnell.
25 However, this note will also proffer that any proposed attempt to regulate § 501 organizations in the same manner likely will be held unconstitutional. Therefore, despite the best efforts of reformers These express words or phrases of advocacy of election or defeat included "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and "reject." Id. at 44 n.52.
37. Id. at 79-80.
the use of money for improper purposes; and facilitating enforcement of the prohibitions of FECA. 27 Furthermore, the Buckley Court placed a narrow construction on the interpretations of the terms "contribution" and "expenditure" as used in FECA in order to avoid overbreadth problems. 28 The Court defined a contribution as "money that is completely given over to another entity, whether to a party, candidate campaign, or political action committee." 29 In contrast, the Court defined an expenditure as "[f]unds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 30 Finally, the Buckley Court held that campaign advertisements were subject to campaign finance regulation while mere issue ads were outside the realm of the FECA.
31
As a result of FECA and the Buckley decision, candidates, parties and groups were allowed to use only hard money to pay for advertisements that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.
32
As stated above, the term "hard money" refers to money raised within the source and contribution limitations of FECA and publicly disclosed to the FEC. 33 Also, under this regime, express advocacy was contrasted with "issue advocacy," which included communications by parties or groups intended to influence a political issue, policy, or proposed legislation, but not to advocate the election of candidates. 34 Essentially issue ads fell outside the regulatory authority as long as the ads did not use explicit words advocating the "election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 35 The Buckley Court listed eight words or phrases that made an ad an electioneering communication as opposed to an educational ad that would be exempt from FECA regulation. 36 Therefore, before BCRA, political advertisements could easily avoid campaign finance regulations as long as they did not employ one of the Buckley Court's words or phrases. [The] provisions of the bill will go a long way toward fixing some of the most pressing problems in campaign finance today. They will result in an election finance system that encourages greater individual participation, and provides the public more accurate and timely information, than does the present system. All of the American electorate will benefit from these measures to strengthen our democracy. Id. at 517-18.
41. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, tit. I, § § 101-103. The pertinent sections of Title I effectively ban soft money. They provide that candidates for state and federal office, as well as national, state, district, and local committees, may not: "solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act." 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (Supp. II 2002). Title I also explains that raising money for fundraising costs is now subject to regulation: "An amount spent by a person described in subsection (a) or (b) to raise funds that are used, in whole or in part, for expenditures and disbursements for a Federal election activity shall be made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act." Id. § 441i(c).
42. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, tit. II, § § 201-204 . Title II, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f), defines "electioneering communications" as:
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which-(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is made within-(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and (III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (Supp. II 2002).
43. Id. § 441i.
B. BCRA-The Revolution in Campaign Finance
BCRA is widely considered the most significant campaign finance legislation influencing federal elections in over twenty-five years.
38 Federal campaign finance law had long been governed by FECA. 39 The passage of BCRA culminated a seven-year effort by its congressional sponsors to significantly amend FECA. 40 BCRA's two main amendments are the ban on raising and spending soft money by the national parties, federal officeholders and enumerated candidates, 41 and the expansion of the definition of "electioneering communications" that determine what constitutes a campaign advertisement. 42 Title I of BCRA also prohibits candidates or federal officeholders from raising or spending soft money in connection with federal election activities. Included in Title I is a ban on raising soft money for other groups, except for some limited activities of nonprofit groups. 44 The term "federal election activity" is defined rather broadly as any ad that promotes or attacks a federal candidate, generic party activity, voter mobilization activity, and voter registration drives inside of 120 days of a federal election. 45 However, BCRA allows candidates and federal officeholders to raise up to $20,000 in soft money from individual contributions for voter mobilization activities of each § 527 or § 501(c) nonprofit group. 46 Although subsequent FEC rulemaking has mitigated the sweeping provisions imposed by BCRA, 47 the 2002 legislation undoubtedly changed the way soft money is funneled into federal election campaigns while not eliminating it completely. 48 Title II of BCRA expanded the "electioneering communications" definition in FECA to include more than the "magic words" given by the Supreme Court in Buckley. 49 The new provision now regulates any broadcast ad that refers to a clearly identified federal candidate within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a primary election. 50 Any electioneering communication or express advocacy over $10,000 must be paid for with hard money, and the source of funds and expenditures must be disclosed to the FEC. 56 In order to hear this important case before the start of the 2004 federal election cycle, the Supreme Court uncharacteristically cut short its summer vacation to hear oral arguments. 57 The Justices recognized that it was crucial to determine the rules for campaign fundraising and spending as soon as possible. dealing with Titles I and II, 61 which ruled that BCRA's two principal, complementary features-Congress's effort to plug the soft-money loophole and its regulation of electioneering communications-must be upheld in the main. 62 In addition, the Court supported nearly every element of BCRA and of campaign finance reform in general. 63 Most important to the 527 Reform Act was the Court's rejection of the very narrow justification for campaign finance laws argued for by the plaintiffs that campaign finance regulations were only justifiable to curtail the type of corruption that causes a change in legislative votes. 64 The Court held otherwise by stating that soft money not only leads to more than just a possible change in legislative votes, but also to "manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress's failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation." 65 The Court opined that to claim that such legislative scheduling changes do not influence legislative outcomes "surely misunderstands the legislative process."
66 Therefore, according to the Supreme Court's analysis, future campaign finance legislation need not be based only upon this narrow interpretation of soft money's corrupting influence but may also be based on the more subtle influences of money unregulated by FECA.
67
This assertion is vital to determining whether the new 527 Reform Act will withstand almost certain First Amendment challenges if it is enacted in essentially the same form as Senator McCain's proposal. 68 Despite the Court's specific language upholding BCRA's main provisions based on "corruption" or the "appearance of corruption," the Court importantly a great deal of deference to Congress to decide whether any given campaign finance policy is sufficient to meet the corruption standard. 69 The Court stated that the "less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley's "closely drawn" scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress's ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise." 70 Furthermore, Justices Stevens and O'Connor explained in reference to the most important pillars of BCRA, Titles I and II, that the Court's deferential standard "provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process."
71 While the Court upheld BCRA with sweeping language under a self-described deferential First Amendment standard, it must be remembered that the Court was sharply divided (5-4) on the most important issues and the recent addition of two new Justices to the Court could mean a reconsideration of the First Amendment analysis and the fate of future campaign finance legislation.
III. THE IMPACT OF § 527 AND § 501 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ON FEDERAL ELECTIONS

A. Types of Tax-Exempt Organizations
The most common type of tax-exempt organizations are those organized under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 73 Groups registered under this Section receive taxdeductible charitable contributions 74 and are exempt from paying income tax as an entity. 91. 11 C.F.R. § § 114.4, 114.14 (2003) . The term "electioneering communications" is used in this providers, and foundations. 77 Groups organized under § 501(c)(3) are strictly prohibited from intervening in campaigns for elected public office, 78 but they may lobby in a very limited capacity.
79
Groups organized under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) are "social welfare organizations" or "civic leagues" that may pursue a somewhat broader range of lobbying, educational, and political activities. 80 Section 501(c)(4) groups resemble § 501(c)(3) organizations because they too are exempt from federal taxes; 81 however, contributions to § 501(c)(4) groups are implicitly not taxdeductible. 82 The "primary activities" of § 501(c)(4) entities must be actions that benefit the public.
83
Section 527 encompasses widely diverse categories of political organizations that include incorporated or unincorporated independent organizations, 84 or PACs organized by a § 501(c) entity under § 527(f).
85
Section 527 groups are usually exempt from federal income taxes 86 and contributions to § 527s are expressly exempted from gift and estate taxes.
87
Section 527 organizations are not registered with the FEC, but must register with the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). 88 Therefore even if such groups do not disclose their contributions and expenditures to the FEC, they must file periodic reports with the IRS. 89 The IRS makes these periodic reports and registrations available to the public. alternative for those who, during the 2004 election cycle, wished to use soft money to promote and attack federal candidates since BCRA prohibited the national committees and federal officeholders from doing the same. 92 Therefore, even though the financial activities of § 527s are no longer as hidden as before BCRA, the financial reports of these groups still do not need to disclose which candidates are being targeted for election or defeat by the election-related activities.
93
B. Section 527 Organizations and the 2004 Federal Elections
The Supreme Court warned about the impact of 527s in McConnell by stating that "[g]iven BCRA's tighter restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives for parties to exploit such organizations will only increase."
94 Fearing the lack of legislative clarity on § 527 groups, numerous groups petitioned the FEC in November 2003 to issue an advisory opinion outlining the permissible uses of these entities. 95 Some campaign watchdog organizations also filed complaints with the FEC charging that many 527s were being used in schemes to avoid the federal ban on soft money. 96 The FEC responded in a limited ruling in February 2004 which applied to only 527s that registered with the FEC and were already restricted to hard money.
97
The most important decision by the FEC came on May 13, 2004, when it announced that it would not impose new regulations on 527s for the remainder of the 2004 federal campaign season. 98 In response to the FEC decision, proRepublican groups were forced to match liberal 527s and form their own organizations in order to utilize large quantities of soft money. t's unfortunate that we're having to even introduce this bill today because the 527s are not in violation of BCRA, they're in violation of the 1974 law, which clearly states that any organization that engages in partisan political activity for the purposes of determining-of affecting the outcome of an election falls under campaign finance laws." Press Conference on 527 Reform Act, supra note 1.
101 loophole squarely on the FEC and have defended BCRA against any perceived deficiencies.
100
For the 2003-04 election cycle, § 527 groups raised and spent over half a billion dollars. 101 Entities organized under § 527 supporting President Bush raised in excess of $64 million and spent over $61 million, while 527s supporting Senator John Kerry raised over $181 million and spent in excess of $186 million. 102 In 2004 alone, § 527 organizations raised a total of $434 million, which constituted $60 million more than for all of the previous three years combined. 103 Therefore, while BCRA seemed to achieve its main goal of campaign finance reform-"removing unregulated and unlimited soft money from the national parties and federal officeholders and candidates, where it poses the greatest potential for corruption"-it seems to have only changed where the battle is fought in the campaign financing war. 104 to consider how a federal court will apply the McConnell standard to this new legislation. Finally, since the 527 Reform Act will bar soft money from only one type of nonprofit tax-exempt organization, it is essential to determine if other entities, such as those formed under § 501(c)(3) and § 502(c)(4), will take on a more significant role in the upcoming 2006 federal elections.
A. Money as Speech
Of course the Constitution does not explicitly provide that the spending of money could be considered a protected form of political speech, as noted by Professor David Ortiz:
One would search the Constitution in vain for any mention of "campaign finance," let alone "contributions," "expenditures," "soft money," or any of the other specialized terms in the campaign finance vocabulary. Yet despite this silence, the U.S. Supreme Court has firmly and repeatedly held that the Constitution greatly limits what Congress and states can do. This is based on the belief that campaign finance regulations restrict political expression and so implicate the First Amendment.
107
In Buckley, the Court created the framework that guides what Congress can and cannot restrict in the world of campaign finance. 108 The Court, in arguably the most important of its campaign finance reform cases, found that money could find constitutional protection as being analogous to speech.
109
Buckley dealt with a First Amendment challenge to many of the 1974 amendments to FECA. 110 The challengers attacked the amendments' limits on various forms of election spending.
111 While considering these challenges, the Court created a critical dichotomy between "contributions" and "expenditures."
112 A contribution was defined as money that is completely given over to another entity, whether to a party, candidate campaign, or political action committee. 113 Essentially, a contribution occurs when the donor retains no control over the future use of the money. An expenditure, in contrast, was defined in Buckley as money given by "organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate."
114
The Court found that regulating expenditures raised more serious First Amendment concerns than regulating contributions, because expenditures convey the reasons why a spender supports or opposes a candidate. 115 Thus, limiting expenditures would necessarily restrict the quantity and quality of political discourse. 116 As the Court wrote:
In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the people-individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and political committees-who must retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign. The compelling governmental interest behind FECA, as articulated in Buckley and in BCRA, was to prevent government corruption. 119 The Court said this interest was sufficient to leave the statute's contribution limits in place, but not the expenditure limits. The Court "struck down all the spending ceilings-on independent expenditures in [or on] behalf of a candidate, on personal funds spent by a candidate in his [or her] own campaign, and on total outlays by the candidate." 120 The Court concluded that, unlike contribution limitations, the expenditure ceilings failed sufficiently to serve the governmental interest in preventing corruption and that the burden they placed on "core First Amendment expression" was unconstitutional.
121 Therefore, the Court recognized that "money is equal to speech, and that maxim was not simply a theoretical construct in political discourse but instead had a impact on the 'quantity and diversity of political speech. '" 122 This decision is consistent with other Supreme Court rulings on "symbolic speech." "Symbolic speech" refers to actions or conduct having strong First Amendment protection as mere extensions of pure protected speech. 123 In Spence v. Washington, for example, the Court considered the issue of when conduct should be regarded as communicative conduct. 124 This case dealt with an individual who taped a peace sign on an American flag after the killing of students at Kent State University and subsequently was convicted of violating a state law prohibiting flag desecration. 125 The Court reversed the conviction and found that the act was speech protected under the First Amendment.
126
The opinion emphasized two factors in concluding that the conduct was communicative: "An intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."
127 Examples of such actions have included refusing to salute the U.S. flag, 128 declining to say the Pledge of Allegiance, 129 the wearing of an armband to protest a war, 130 displaying a flag, 131 and the burning of the United States flag.
132
To be protected under the First Amendment, this type of speech "need not convey a 'narrow, succinctly articularly message,' nor even any 'particularized message' in order to merit protection."
133
The Supreme Court has given sweeping protection to such symbolic speech even when it conveys only the most general message. 134 Bradley A. Smith, a former Commissioner of the FEC, has concluded that the spending of money on political campaigns constitutes this type of protected symbolic speech: Given this case history over many years, it is too late, really, to argue that a gift of money is not a form of protected symbolic speech, at least when made to a political candidate. However, it upheld O'Brien's conviction for destroying his draft card by holding that symbolic speech could be restricted where such restrictions furthered a significant government interest, provided that the interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression and the "incidental" restriction on First Amendment freedoms was "no greater than essential." 139 Those who favor campaign finance regulation have used the O'Brien decision to justify judicial deference to legislative limits on political expenditures and contributions. They contend that "like O'Brien's draft card, the money at stake in political giving is merely a vehicle for political expression, not political expression itself."
140 Furthermore, reformers contend that if this is true, such speech may be regulated under legislation that serves an important government interest. Advocates conclude that a law that targets money, rather than speech directly, should therefore be subjected to a less rigorous level of judicial scrutiny.
B. McConnell v. FEC's Deferential First Amendment Standard Applied to the 527 Reform Act
The McConnell Court stated that the "less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits . . . shows proper deference to Congress's decision to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it
